BSF Director General Ajay Raj Sharma, heading the 15-member Indian delegation, and his BDR counterpart Major General Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, leading the 19-member home team, discussed the usual border irritants between the two highly populous neighbours. BDR officials bombarded the media in Dhaka with charges that included killing of 15 'innocent' Bangladeshi nationals by the BSF and Indian civilians between January and March 2004, push-in attempt of 'Bengali speaking Indian nationals' by the BSF, setting up of 'illegal structures' by India within 150-yard of the zero point in violation of international rules and regulations, and trafficking of women and children. Besides, the BDR officials, according to Bangladeshi media reports, also raised the issue of drug and illegal arms smuggling from India.

The Indian side, on its part, sought the strengthening of BDR-BSF coordination to prevent border crimes, ensuring border security, and environmental conservation. The Indian delegation also sought details regarding the latest position on the implementation of the 1974 Indira-Mujib Accord between the two countries.

New Delhi and Dhaka have, at fairly regular intervals, been discussing issues that are actually 'borderless' in the sense that terrorism and crime recognize no national borders. However, evidences, again coming up at regular intervals, suggest that sections within the Bangladeshi power structure could well be aiding and abetting separatist insurgencies in India's Northeast, by way of providing shelter to top militant leaders and cadres, besides extending transit facilities for illegal weapons shipments to India's troubled Northeastern frontier. When these facts are taken into account, the stark reality of a border that exists, and which needs to be demarcated and protected, becomes impossible to ignore.

Take, for instance, the April 2, 2004, arms seizure near the Chittagong Port in southern Bangladesh. Well placed Indian intelligence sources disclose that the cache comprised 1,790 rifles, that included Uzi sub-machine guns and those of the AK series, 150 rocket launchers, 840 rockets, 2,700 grenades and more than one million rounds of ammunition. These weapons were being put onto ten trucks after being unloaded in the eastern bank of the Karnafully river from two trawlers that originated in Malaysia. According to local media reports in Guwahati, capital of Northeastern India's Assam
state, the trawlers are owned by the brother of a ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader. The ships he owns often use the Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Limited (CUFL) jetty, near Chittagong, to unload consignments. It was at this jetty that Bangladeshi paramilitary troopers carried out the raid that was to lead to the biggest ever illegal arms haul in the country's history. The local police would have let the trucks roll - and there are reports that they were actually overseeing the unloading operation - but for the arrival of Bangladesh Coast Guard personnel who seized the cache and informed the higher authorities.

When this issue was raised at the just-concluded border talks at Dhaka, Bangladesh had already assured India that it would share the findings of the probe into the huge arms haul with New Delhi. The seized weapons are currently in the custody of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), a new security outfit created to tackle law and order in Bangladesh. Prime Minister Khaleda Zia's ruling BNP and the opposition Awami League headed by former Premier Sheikh Hasina are accusing each other of complicity in the arms shipment. However, the probe team, according to reports from Dhaka, has apparently already 'ruled out' any political links in the murky affair.

The seizure of such a large consignment of illegal arms is itself a highly disturbing development, and when such a huge quantity of lethal military hardware is destined for a foreign location, the issue becomes all the more serious. Reports indicate that at least 16 Indian insurgents have been arrested by the Bangladesh security forces in this connection. Dhaka has refused to confirm these arrests, as that would go against its stated position that no Indian insurgents were operating from the country's territory. Those arrested belong to outlawed rebel groups such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur, the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), also from Manipur, and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF).

Former Bangladesh Army generals and security analysts were as shocked as security watchers in India over the weapons haul. Some former Bangladesh Army generals observed that the weapons recovered and the quantity involved are normally used in conventional warfare against a regular army. One former Army top gun in Dhaka went to the extent of commenting that the weapons seized were almost equivalent to those possessed by the Comilla Division of the Bangladesh Army. They felt that 'well-organized syndicates' in Bangladesh could have used the country only as a transit route and that the arms may have been heading for the Maoist rebels in Nepal or the separatists in India's northeast. An English daily from Dhaka, The Daily Star, quoted 'intelligence agents' as stating that the weapons could have been headed for Assam. Indian authorities insist that the topmost military commander of the outlawed ULFA was operating his anti-India insurgency from his base in Dhaka and elsewhere in Bangladesh.

Against this backdrop, it is not surprising to find the BSF chief justifying India's move to erect a fence along the entire 4,500 kilometer-long border with Bangladesh. Dhaka, however, has sought to impose a condition on the issue. "Bangladesh is not against fencing. But, it wants that it should be erected 150 yards away from the border," BDR Director General Chowdhury was quoted as saying.

Dhaka's attempts at deflecting attention from concerns among major western powers about Bangladesh turning into the latest hub of terror, both Islamist and other, have failed on more occasions than one. Recent developments have only further exposed the goings-on in that country. Even during the latest round of the BSF-BDR talks in Dhaka, the Bangladesh side sought to pin down the Indian officials by furnishing a list of 39 camps of anti-Bangladesh insurgent groups allegedly operating from India. The Indian side had flatly rejected these suggestions. Dhaka's claim can be dismissed rather easily because, after the recent arms seizure in Chittagong, security analysts in Bangladesh, including several former Bangladesh Army generals, have openly stated that the weapons seized could not have been used by local militants who were not sufficiently trained to use such sophisticated military hardware. Bangladesh can hardly be serious in trying to suggest that militants capable of using only homemade weapons are operating from India!

During the talks, India had once again made a case for joint patrolling of the border by the border guards of the two countries, a proposal Dhaka has rejected. On the face of it, the joint patrolling proposal makes excellent sense. An estimated 6,000 people from Bangladesh cross over into India every day in search of work, many of them with the intention of settling permanently in the country. The border areas are also notorious for human trafficking in women and children, trans-border terrorism, and smuggling. India has repeatedly provided lists of terrorist camps in Bangladesh; Bangladesh has now reacted by giving its own list of alleged terrorist camps in India. Both countries have, individually, an insufficient force to effectively patrol the border, and joint patrolling would help end abuses on both side. This was conceded during the March 2002 meeting between the Directors General of the BSF and the BDR, when India had submitted the joint patrolling proposal in a list of six 'confidence building measures', and the then DG BDR had said that the proposals could secure some dividends, and had directed them to his Government for clearance. The issue came up again during the BSF-BDR meeting in March 2003, following which it was agreed that joint patrolling would be implemented from July 1, 2003. However, instead of responding to the BSF's draft on modalities for joint patrolling, Bangladesh rejected the proposal on August 1, 2003, with Foreign Minister Morshed Khan stating that the proposal was 'not feasible'. Indian Foreign Secretary, Shashank, also raised the issue during his visit to Bangladesh on March 10, 2004. This time the proposal was shot down by Bangladesh Home Minister Altaf Hossain Chowdhury on the grounds that, since India had made specific allegations about the existence of terrorist camps in his country's territory, there was 'no need for joint patrol.'

The BSF-BDR talks are intended as an exercise at smoothening out existing irritants and ensuring the security of both nations, rather than sessions aimed at leveling charges and counter-charges. A higher degree of transparency on Dhaka's part will be necessary before this annual exercise can serve its intended purpose. Absence of such transparency within the structure of bilateral relations, future options can only include international scrutiny and investigations into developments such as the latest arms haul and Bangladesh's support to terrorist and extremist groups - options that Premier Khaleda Zia would certainly prefer to exclude.