( Based on my impressions during a visit to Washington DC from March 29 to April 4,2004, to attend a conference on Indo-US Strategic Co-operation and a study of subsequent developments)

While one hears more talk of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda in the USA than of Iraq, there is greater concern in people's minds over what has been happening in Iraq than over the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan or over the unsatisfactory security situation there or over the activities of the Al Qaeda dregs in Pakistan.

2. While those who influence and make policies do not like to admit it in public, a realisation is slowly sinking in that they seem to have stirred up a hornet's nest in Iraq, the consequences of which in the region and in the larger Islamic world would be unpredictable.

3.If anti-American violence continues on the present scale in Iraq, there is a possibility of Mr.George Bush being defeated in the forthcoming elections because of the voters' dissatisfaction over his handling of the Iraqi war than because of his handling of the so-called war against international terrorism.

4. The dissatisfaction with Bush over Iraq is not due to ethical reasons. Large sections of the American people still believe that Bush was justified in going to war in Iraq and in overthrowing Saddam Hussein through the use of the American military power. The fact that no weapons of mass destruction or no evidence of the alleged links of the Saddam regime with Al Qaeda have been found has had no impact on their mind. There is no sense of shock that their Government had misrepresented facts and misjudged the situation in deciding to go to war in Iraq.

5. Saddam hardly has any supporter or sympathiser in the US. The majority of the American people has no doubt in its mind that Saddam was as great a demon as bin Laden and hence needed to be overthrown. The growing disquiet in public mind is not over the advisability of the US intervention, but over the unsatisfactory manner in which the Bush Administration has handled the sequel, thereby letting its soldiers be caught in a quagmire.

6. Make no mistake about it. Iraq is no Vietnam. And the USA of 2004 is not the USA of the 1960s and the early 1970s. The sight of body bags has no longer the same impact on American minds as one had seen during the Vietnam war. There is a greater sense of patriotism in the USA today than there was in the USA of the 1960s and the 1970s.They are prepared to die and they are prepared to see their co-citizens die if they are convinced that the deaths are for a worthy cause and are producing results which are favourable to their national interests.

7.Once Saddam has been overthrown, they do not see any other cause worth dying for in Iraq. Arguments about establishing democracy in Iraq, making Iraq a role model for the rest of West Asia etc do not fire their imagination. Even if there be no worthy cause, they might be prepared to accept the increasing number of deaths of their soldiers provided they are convinced that their deaths are leading to results, which would strenghten American interests in the region and the world.

8. But, they see no results either. They look upon the post-May 2003 fighting in Iraq as a war without a cause and a war without results. It is this which is damaging the image of Bush in the eyes of growing sections of his people.

9. Barring a small number of analysts, which has been raising inconvenient questions about the advisability of going to war, the questions which have been agitating the minds of a large number of people and moulders of public opinion do not relate to the advisability of the unilateral use of American power to bring about the change of a regime hated in the USA. They relate more to the limitations and inadequacies of American military power and intelligence capability as demonstrated in Iraq.

10. The projection by Bush and his advisers of the resistance fighters in Iraq as a bunch of thugs and terrorists (incidentally Saddam was using the same expression while talking of his opponents) not supported by the majority of the Iraqis is inevitably giving rise to the question: If they are really in such a minority, how come 130,000 plus well-funded, well-armed, and well-equipped US forces are not able to overwhelm them for nearly a year.

11. The credibility of the US intelligence community in the eyes of the people is at its lowest now. It has been taking a tremendous beating during the current enquiries into the 9/11 terrorist strikes and Bush and his advisers, including Dr.Condoleeza Rice, his National Security Adviser, have contributed to the loss of morale by the manner in which they have been projecting the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as clueless before 9/11, in an attempt to escape responsibility for their own sins of commission and omission.

12. During the last five years, the annual budget of the intelligence community has doubled from US $ 20 billion to US $ 40 billion. Despite this, the human as well as technical intelligence agencies continue to be totally clueless as to what the hell is going on in Iraq. Who is their enemy? The Iraqi people? The Sunnis? The Shias? The ex-Baathists? The former members of the disbanded Army? Al Qaeda? Foreign terrorists? Nobody knows.

13. The way the decisions are made in total disregard of the ground realities is illustrated by the manner in which June 30 was fixed as the date for the hand-over of responsibility for governance and internal security management to a manipulated Iraqi leadership council, without first ensuring that it would have at its disposal a dependable administrative and security infrastructure. The administrative and security infrastructure, which Iraq had developed over a period of three decades, was disbanded overnight, because of its perceived proximity to Saddam How can any power---that too an external power which is a total stranger to Iraqi society---hope to create a totally new infrastructure within one year?

14. During the recent uprisings, the Americans realised to their shock that many of those whom they had recruited, trained and armed in haste to replace Saddam's Police and security forces were undependable. One entire battalion disobeyed the orders of its American officers to move to Fallujah to assist the US Marines. There has been an increasing number of desertions from other units.

15. It is against this background that one has to discuss what should be and could be the role of India vis-a-vis Iraq? Certain points need to be underlined as I have been repeatedly doing so in the past too:
* Despite the exaggerations by the US about the extent of the involvement of foreign jihadi terrorists, there is no doubt that there has been foreign involvement, most of the foreign jihadis being Pakistanis, Arabs of Chechen origin and others.
* Despicable acts such as the mutilation of the dead bodies of killed American civilian workers cannot be the work of Iraqis, whatever be their anger against the US. These mutilations closely resemble the modus operandi of Pakistani jihadi organisations such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) etc, which are members of bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF).
* It is not in the interest of India or the rest of the international community for these jihadi terrorists to prevail over the USA. If they succeed, it is going to be even more difficult than it has been now to control and erdicate the foreign jihadi terrorists operating in different countries, including India.

16. In the US, there is still some expectation that after the forthcoming elections in India, New Delhi could be persuaded to send a Division of its Army to Iraq to help the Americans to restore law and order there and pave the way for a genuinely elected government, representing the will of the majority of the Iraqi people. It will not be in India's interest to allow its Army to be deployed in Iraq to help the Americans, either under or outside a UN mandate. This could prove counter-productive and add to our own difficulties in our territory in dealing with the jihadi terrorists.

17. There is very little that India can do in the short-term. In the medium and long-term, India should be able to help the US or the UN, whoever has the overall command and control post-June 30, in re-organising the administrative and security infrastructure of Iraq which would enable it to take its place in the international community as a modern and secular State. This could be in the form of the training of a large number of Iraqi officers in India, deputation of Indian officials to Iraq to help restore the economy, helping to establish an independent electoral system etc

18. Before one could identify areas in which India could play a constructive role in Iraq in a manner which would promote the interests of the Iraqi people and the international community as a whole and not just American interests, it would be important to have a sustained dialogue in depth with the USA. For this purpose, the two countries could set up a joint working group on Iraq to initiate a dialogue on how they could co-operate in putting Iraq back on its feet. A similar dialogue with the Iraqi leadership is also necessary, even though the present leadership, largely nominated by the Americans, does not enjoy much credibility. India should also establish independent lines of communications with respected leaders of the Shia community in Iraq such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com )